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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE ^  
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE W. FLICK, * 
Plaintiff and Respondent, * Case No. 
vs. * 14154 
GLEN VAN TASSELL and VAN'S SERVICE,* 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
* 
Defendants and Appellants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY BRIEF 
INTRODUCTION 
This Supplemental Reply Brief is filed pursuant to 
the Order of Chief Justice Henriod dated February 6, 1976, 
permitting appellants to file a brief going beyond the issues 
raised by the appellants1 brief in chief and also allowing 
supplemental Affidavits. This Supplemental Brief and accompany-
ing Affidavits are prepared for the purpose of setting forth 
appellants1 contentions that they were denied adequate counsel 
during the trial and initial appeal of this matter because of 
the gross negligence of the two attorneys representing appellants. 
It is further contended by appellants that this conduct has been 
concealed from the record of, this case by these attorneys and 
it is therefore necessary to supplement the record in order for 
the truth to be known. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This was originally an action brought against the 
defendants by the plaintiff for the return of certain sums of 
money advanced to defendants and for damages sustained as an 
alleged result of violation of Utah securities laws. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court, Judge Ronald C. Hyde, granted 
default judgment to plaintiff on March 19, 1974 in the amount 
of $263,561.00. (R. 178). A Motion to Set Aside the Default 
was made by appellants on April 1, 1975 (R. .180-182) and the 
trial court denied this Motion on May 13, 1975 (R. 217) and 
entered its Order on June 3, 1975. (R. 230). The Notice of 
Appeal in this case was filed on June 11, 1975 and erroneously 
referred to the Order as a "Motion for New Trial" and erroneously 
referred to the date as May 13 1975 rather than June 3, 197 5. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-appellants seek an Order setting aside the 
default entered against defendants on March 26. 1975 or, in the 
alternative, remand of this case to the trial court for further 
proceedings as to the grounds for setting aside the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants' new counsel in preparing this Supplemental 
Brief believe that the facts relating to the original lawsuit are 
basically immaterial to the issue on this appeal except for the 
purpose of showing that a valid defense does exist and that 
• - 2 -
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should the case be remanded for a new trial it would not be 
a waste of judicial time. These defenses are discussed in 
appellants' brief in chief at pages 2, 3 and 8. In addition, 
it should be noted that a Counterclaim was filed by defendant 
Glen Van Tassell against plaintiff which has never been decided 
by the trial court in any of the proceedings. (R. 116). 
The main concern of appellants' new counsel is the 
conduct and gross negligence of appellants' former counsel during 
the discovery period, during trial, post-trial motions, and 
the initial appeal to this Court. 
In December of 1973 defendant Glen Van Tassell was 
served with the Complaint. (Affidavit of Glen Van Tassell, 1M[ 1 
and 2 -- Hereinafter referred to as Glen Affidavit — ; R. 1-3). 
Immediately upon receipt of this pleading defendant contacted 
attorney-at-law Boyd Fullmer to represent him. 
During this period of time defendant Van Tassell spent 
most of his days in Bancroft, Idaho in the Bancroft, Idaho 
vicinity, but was able to communicate with his Bountiful residence 
by telephone. He was within three to four hours of traveling 
time between each location (Glen Affidavit 1[3) • While in Idaho 
his wife informed him by telephone that she had been served with 
papers from a Constable and defendant Van Tassell instructed her 
to immediately deliver these papers to Mr. Fullmer. (Glen 
Affidavit 1(4; Affidavit of Erma Van Tassell 113 —Hereinafter 
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referred to as Erma Affidavit.) Defendant was never personally 
aware of any date other than February 4, 1974 for the taking of 
his deposition, at which time he attended. (Glen Affidavit 
114.) In fact, however, notices of depositions were given on 
January 21, 1974 and January 11, 1974 (R. 11, 13) and sanctions 
were requested by plaintiff's attorney on January 23, 1974 for 
defendant's failure to attend. (R. 18). 
At the deposition of February 4th Mr. Fullmer informed 
plaintiff's counsel that he would turn over to plaintiff's 
counsel certain mining contracts. Defendant had previously given 
all copies of such contract to Mr. Fullmer and had no copies 
in his possession at that time. (Glen Affidavit 1[5.) Defendant 
was unaware that Mr. Fullmer had failed to turn over such con-
tracts as described in the Affidavit of plaintiff's attorney dated 
June 24, 1974. (R. 34). 
Defendant did not request Mr. Fullmer to represent to 
the court that an extension was necessary because of defendant's 
cattle business (R. 24) since it was always inconvenient for 
defendant to leave his ranch at all times, since only he and his 
son were running the operation. (Glen Affidavit, 1M[ 3 and 4) . 
On June 24, 1974 plaintiff submitted his "First Set 
of Interrogatories to Defendant Glen Van Tassell". These 
Interrogatories are critical to this appeal since the failure to 
answer them was one basis for the default entered against defen-
dants. Defendant was never informed of the existence of these 
-4-
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Interrogatories until the early part of March, 197 5. He was 
never requested to supply any information to answer these 
Interrogatories. (Glen Affidavit, 1M[ 6 and 20). 
Defendant was never informed that an Order on July 
15, 1974 issued by Judge Swan compelled him to produce certain 
financial records, contracts, and tax returns and that an award 
of $100.00 attorney's fee was entered, (R, 50-51). 
Defendant and his wife left for a world tour in July 
and August of 1974. Fullmer, however, knew about this trip 
for three months prior to their leaving and defendants consulted 
Fullmer and were told that there was nothing for them to do and 
that they should leave as scheduled. (Glen Affidavit, 1[12) . 
This is contrary to Fullmerfs Affidavit, who used their trip 
as an excuse for failing to produce. (R. 55) . 
Defendant Van Tassell received no notification by Mr. 
Fullmer that Judge Gould on September 30, 1974 had entered an 
Order, by stipulation, that defendant was to answer the June 
24th Interrogatories not later than October 20, 1974, (R. 
74-75; Glen Affidavit, 1f9) . 
On October 17, 1974 plaintiff's attorney submitted 
Request for Production and Request for Admission to Mr. Fullmer. 
Defendant was not informed that these requests were made. Defen-
dant did not authorize Mr. Fullmer to object to these documents 
because of defendant's presence in Idaho and would have been 
willing to come to Utah upon Mr. Fullmer's request that the 
documents be supplied and the questions be answered. (Glen 
-5-
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Affidavit, 1f 1( 10 and 11) . Once again, however, Fullmer 
represented that the distance justified delay. (R. 94). 
Defendant was never informed by Mr, Fullmer that 
plaintiff's attorney was moving again for sanctions for failure 
to answer the June 24th Interrogatories, by requesting a default 
judgment be entered and by requesting that $800,00 attorney's 
fees be awarded, (R. 102; Glen Affidavit, 1(12) . Likewise, 
defendant was not informed by Mr. Fullmer that a subsequent 
Order by Judge Swan on December 18, 1974 ordered that sanctions 
be imposed if defendant failed to answer the Interrogatories, 
Admissions and produce the documents requested in October. 
(R. 120; Glen Affidavit 1114), 
During this period defendant requested Fullmer to file 
a claim against plaintiff for the $200,000.00 remaining to be 
paid to Van Tassell on the mining claims, for half of the amount 
necessary to perform the annual assessment work, and for defama-
tion of defendant's character by plaintiff. Fullmer informed 
defendant that a Counterclaim had been filed concerning all of 
these claims. (Glen Affidavit 1(13) . In fact, however, only the 
libel claim was filed against plaintiff. (R, 116-117) • 
Defendant never received or was notified that plaintiff's 
counsel again made a Motion to Strike defendant's Answer or for 
failing to respond to the discovery as ordered by the Court 
(R. 143; Glen Affidavit, 1115). 
Plaintiff's counsel sent to Fullmer and to defendant 
a "Notice to Appoint Counsel". Defendant, however, did not 
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personally receive this notice since it was sent to his 
residence in Bountiful while he was in Idaho. In a 
telephone conversation between defendant in Idaho and 
his wife in Utah, defendant advised her to take this document 
to Mr. Fullmer. It is probable the letter was not even opened. 
At that time it is believed that defendant's daughter personally 
delivered the document to Mr. Fullmer. (R. 149; Glen Affidavit, 
1(16; Erma Affidavit, f,[1[ 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8; Affidavit of Joy Van 
Tassell, 1M[ 2 and 3). 
During the middle or latter part of February Mr. Fullmer 
informed defendant that Fullmer did not have sufficient time to 
devote to the trial of this case which was supposed to occur in 
the latter part of March. He suggested that another attorney be 
obtained. Defendant agreed to get another attorney and Fullmer 
recommended Mr. Reed Tuft. (Glen Affidavit, 1[19) . 
In the latter part of February or early part of March 
a meeting was held with Fullmer and Tuft at which time Tuft 
agreed to take the case if he could be paid at least $2,000.00. 
Defendant agreed to this and subsequently the file was delivered 
to Tuft including the Interrogatories, Admissions, and Request 
for Production of Documents. It was during this time that 
defendant was shown these documents for the first time by Mr. 
Fullmer and told by Mr. Tuft not to answer them since a continuance 
would be granted by the trial court. (Glen Affidavit, 1[1[ 19 and : 
20). 
-7-
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On March 4, 1975 Judge Thornley Swan denied 
Fullmer1s Motion to continue the trial for the purpose of 
obtaining new counsel, and set a firm date. (R. 151, 153). 
Defendant was not informed by Fullmer that the court granted 
until March 14th the time to respond to the Request for Ad-
missions filed in October or that the failure to respond would 
deem such request admitted. (R. 153; Glen Affidavit 1121). 
On March 5, 197 5 Fullmer made a Motion for Withdrawal 
of Attorney. (R. 152). On March 12, 1975 plaintiff's attorney 
again sent notice to Fullmer that he would move for a default 
on March 19th for failure to respond to the Interrogatories, 
Admissions, and produce documents. Defendant was never notified 
of this notice. (Glen Affidavit, 1122). 
Between the early part of March and March 19th defendant 
repeatedly contacted both Mr. Tuft and Mr. Fullmer, He was 
told by Fullmer to do whatever Tuft requested. Tuft informed 
him that it would be unnecessary for him to attend the March 
19th hearing and told him to tell anyone whol asked that it was 
his understanding it was a pretrail. On several occasions defen-
dant went to Tuft's office to assist in the trial, but was only 
asked on each occasion whether he had more money for Tuft. 
Finally, he was able to raise a total of $1,700,00 which was paid 
to Tuft. (Glen Affidavit 1(23) . 
On or about March 18th defendant contacted Mr. Fullmer 
and asked him if he needed to attend the hearing on the 19th. 
-8-
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Fullmer said he should not attend if Tuft had told him not 
to attend. Fullmer stated it was his understanding, having talked 
with Tuft, that defendant was not to come to the proceeding. 
Defendant also called Tuft, who again told him not to worry 
about the March 19th hearing and to be sure to say that it was 
his understanding that the March 19th proceeding was a pretrial 
if anyone asked. Defendant did not know the distinction be-
tween a pretrial and trial. Tuft told defendant that he would 
take care of anything that happened and would let defendant 
know after the hearing. Defendant presumed that Tuft would 
appear personally at the hearing. (Glen Affidavit, If24) . 
On March 17, 1975 Tuft mailed a copy of a Petition to 
Appear as Counsel to Fullmer, Findlay and the Court, but made 
no other personal attempt to gain appearance. (R. 156). It 
was filed in the Clerk's office on March 19, 197 5 — the day 
of trial. 
It was evidentally the purpose of Tuft to prevent the 
trial court from setting a continuance of one or two weeks. He 
reasoned that by carefully planning his appearance with Fullmer's 
withdrawal that Van Tassell would be left with no counsel and 
that the Court would, therefore, grant a long continuance, 
(Affidavit of Robert Sykes 1[5 — hereinafter referred to as Syfces 
Affidavit). Tuft was surprised when a default rather than a 
continuance was entered (Syk.es Affidavit, [^7)
 # 
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On March 19th, the day of the trial, defendant was 
at his Bountiful residence and was available for trial had 
he been notified by his counsel to attend* (Glen Affidavit, 
K24). On March 19th trial was commenced before the Honorable 
•Ronald C. Hyde with plaintiff being represented by Joseph 
Henriod and Bruce Findlay, and defendant not being present 
but with an appearance by Boyd Fullmer. (R. 159). At this 
hearing Mr. Fullmer represented to the Court the following: 
"I talked to my client as late as Thurs-
day. The answers to these requests for admissions 
and interrogatories and the production of docu-
ments were due Friday, last Friday, and he was 
aware of that as late as last Thursday without 
my prompting him; and I advised him that he had 
to have those in. I talked to him as late as 
yesterday and told him that if the court allowed 
me to withdraw this morning I would withdraw 
and not further participate in the case. I think 
he's fully aware," (P. 2, Mar. 19, 197 5 hearing.) 
When asked if the defendant was personally aware of the setting 
Fullmer replied: 
"Yes. Mr, Tuft is and Mr. Van Tassell is. 
They are both aware of this. Mr. Findlay and 
I have both received the notice of Mr. Tuft to 
enter his appearance as counsel for the defendant. 
. . . I do so desire to withdraw. I don't have the 
file. I don't feel that on memory I should attempt 
to try this case, and I feel that whatever I could 
do at this moment, with the file in the hands 
of the other counsel, would be a disservice to the 
other counsel." (P. 3, Mar. 19, 1975 hearing.) 
Upon Mr. Fullmer's representation he was allowed to 
withdraw from the case and the trial proceeded in the absence of 
any attorneys or opposition. Evidence was then offered by the 
-10-
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plaintiff and a judgment was granted as prayed for in the 
amount of $265,561.55 plus interest of 6%, (R, 159)f Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law together with the Judgment were 
subsequently entered by the trial court, (R, 160-178)n 
•} 
On the day following the trial defendant called 
Tuft and asked him what had developed. Tuft informed him 
that the hearing was under advisement and that the defendant 
should call him in three or four days, Defendant was unclear 
as to what was under advisement but Tuft would be no more 
specific. (Glen Affidavit 1(25) , Several days later defendant 
called Boyd Fullmer who informed him that a judgment had been 
entered upon the day of trial. Defendant was understandably 
upset and immediately called Tuft, who confirmed that the 
judgment had been entered but reassured defendant that it would 
be set aside, and told defendant not to worry, that Tuft would 
take care of everything. Tuft informed defendant that he would 
have to send him more money, however, at that time, (Glen 
Affidavit, 1(26) . 
On April 1st defendant went to the offices of Reed Tuft 
.to sign a document entitled "Motion to Met Aside Default Judgment". 
(R. 180-182). On this occasion defendant asked Tuft why it 
was stated that his residence was in Idaho and Tuft explained 
that residence was a technicality and that it was proper to 
say this. He told Tuft that it was rare he could not be reached 
by telephone, but Tuft said not to be concerned about it. 
-11-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(Glen Affidavit, 1[28) . He also informed Tuft that he did 
not consider a communication problem existed with Fullmer or 
that there was any tension as stated in the document. Tuft 
informed defendant that this was Fullmer's view and Tuft's 
view, and that defendant should not worry about this either. 
(Glen Affidavit, 1(29) . Defendant was then told to sign this 
document, but did not understand what effect the signature 
could be given. (Glen Affidavit, 1(31) . At this time he stated 
to Tuft and Sykes that he had not been told by anyone to be 
in Court on March 19th. (Sykes Affidavit, 1(7). 
Around April 23rd defendant was informed by Tuft to 
go to the Davis County Courthouse where a hearing would be held 
to set aside the Judgment. He informed defendant not to worry, 
that everything would be taken care of. (Glen Affidavit, 1(32) . 
Despite the suggestions of Sykes, a lawyer associated 
with Tuft and working on the case, Tuft instructed John Marshall 
to handle the argument. Marshall was quickly briefed by Sykes 
shortly before arriving at the courthouse. (Sykes Affidavit, 
1H8 and 9) . 
On April 24th defendant met Tuft, John Marshall, Tuft's 
partner, and Robert Sykes, an associate of Tuft and Marshall, at 
the courthouse doors. At this time Marshall stated that he was 
not prepared to adequately handle it. Tuft told Marshall that it 
would work better with Tuft not present and that Marshall should 
do the best he could. Tuft told defendant, as they were proceed-
ing into the courthouse, to be sure to mention that the March 
-12-
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19th proceeding was a pretrial. (Glen Affidavit/ If32) . 
A hearing was held by Judge Hyde at this time on the 
Motion to Set Aside the Judgment with defendant Van Tassell and 
Boyd Fullmer both testifying. Mr. Marshall asked Van Tassell 
certain questions designed to show confusion on the part of 
defendant. Defendant testified throughout, however, that he 
was told that he did not need to come for trial, and that he 
did not know the difference between a pretrial and a trial. 
(P. 13 of April 24 hearing). No testimony was taken to the 
reasons for delaying the discovery, or as to the conversations 
and conduct between Mr. Tuft and defendant.. In the opinion of 
Mr. Sykes, because of Mr. Marshall's ignorance of the facts 
and law he was unable to properly show the conduct of defendant 
and his attorney as it related to discovery delays, and failed 
to attend trial. (Sykes Affidavit, flfl 10 and 11). He did not 
believe that the Court was fully advised as to what had actually 
occurred. (Sykes Affidavit, 1[11) . 
On May 13, 197 5 Judge Hyde issued a Memorandum Decision 
denying the Motion to Vacate and an Order was entered accordingly 
on June 3, 1975. (R. 216-217, p. 230). 
Shortly thereafter Tuft informed defendant that he would 
not represent him any further unless defendant would give him 
a $25,000.00 mortgage on defendant's property. When defendant 
refused, Tuft informed him that he should seek other counsel. 
(Glen Affidavit, 1(34). Thereafter, defendant contacted Mr. 
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Fullmer, who said he would represent him on appeal. (Glen 
Affidavit, p. 35). Defendant paid to Fullmer approximately 
$5,000.00 to handle this litigation from its inception to the 
filing of the appellants1 brief. (Glen Affidavit, 1(34). 
Since March 19, 1975 there have been a total of less 
than $5,000.00 in judgments outstanding against defendants, 
and the amount of potential awards now in litigation is 
$10,000, even assuming maximum recoveries. Defendants' present 
assets greatly exceed these amounts. (Glen Affidavit, 11 ) . 
The law firm of Worsley, Snow & Christensen was retained 
after the appellee's brief had been submitted to the Court and 
application was made to the Court for permission to file this 
Supplemental Brief and Affidavit. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires 
the setting aside of a judgment when such judgment was obtained 
by the gross neglect and negligence of the attorneys representing 
the injured party. 
Appellants submit that this case is a classic of the cover-
up schemes so predominant with the Watergate investigation. 
This case involves an instance where defendant Van Tassell hired 
two separate attorneys who he believed were competent and would 
do whatever necessary to protect his interests but who neglected 
and purposely conducted themselves against Van Tassell. These 
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same attorneys were the ones who established the record in the 
lower court and who carefully kept the facts from becoming 
known to the trial court as to the grounds why the default 
judgment should be set aside. For these reasons, this is 
an extraordinary case which requires this Court to correct 
an intollerable injustice. 
Appellants would submit that the trial court was correct 
in its finding that the evidence submitted to it did not 
justify a conclusion of "excusable neglect" as required by 
Subsection 1 of Rule 60(b). The facts in this case clearly 
show that the neglect to answer the Interrogatories, Admissions, 
and to produce the documents was in no way "excusable." 
Likewise, the failure of defendant or counsel to be at the 
March 19 trial was also not "excusable." Thus, the failure 
of discovery and the failure to attend trial constituted 
complete disregard for the judicial process and should not 
be tollerated by any court. Appellants state for the record 
that they believe both the trial court and the attorneys for 
Respondent were more than fair in giving Appellants every 
opportunity to remedy the discovery failure. The record 
shows that the Court gave Appellantsf counsel numerous 
opportunities to comply with the requests of Respondent's 
counsel, but that in each case the opportunities were ignored. 
The persons who constituted a threat to the judicial process 
were not the Appellants in their individual or corporate 
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capacity but were rather the attorneys representing Appellants. 
These individuals completely ignored their duty to their client 
and forgot their function as officers of the judicial system. 
It is well settled that a client is entitled to relief 
from the gross neglect and negligence of his attorneys when 
no showing of prejudicial harm can be made to third parties. 
Rule 60(b) (7) states the following: 
"Upon motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the Court may in the futherance of justice relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons (7) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment." 
Subdivision 7 is identical to subdivision 6 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and is identical to other rules of surrounding 
states. For this reason, references made in the following 
cases may be to different subdivision numbers but they are 
referring to the exact language contained in subdivision 7 of 
the Utah Rules. 
In King v. Mordowanec, 46 F.R.D. 474 (D. R. I. 1969) the 
Court granted a motion made by plaintiff's new attorney some 
one and one-half years after an action had been dismissed with 
prejudice on the grounds that plaintiff's former attorney 
committed such gross neglect of plaintiff's case that justice 
required the reinstatement of the claim. The Court stated: 
"[G]ross neglect of a lawyer in failing to 
prosecute his client's case is beyond Rule 60(b)(1) 
and, hence, within Rule 60(b)(6), as long as the 
client is unaware of and does not share in his 
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lawyer's negligence." 
Because the plaintiff in the King case had not been notified 
of his attorney's neglect of his case until it was discovered 
subsequently that it had been dismissed, the District Court 
stated: 
"It would be the practice of this Court to 
notify clients, where possible, of their lawyer's 
dilatoriness in cases such as this and to use the 
fine as a means of enforcing the Court's rule 
rather than to use the dismissal as a means of 
visiting upon the often innocent client the sins 
of his attorney." Id at 478-579. 
In Transport Pool Division v. Joe Jones Truck Company, 
319 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Geo. 1970) the Court set aside a default 
judgment when it was obtained because of the gross neglect of 
the defendant's counsel. The Court stated: 
"[T]he reason and answer was not filed in the first 
place and the reason the motion was not filed in 
the second was not the neglect of Jones but the 
gross and inexcusable neglect of his counsel. At 
least one other court has held that dismissal 
resulting from counsel's inexcusable neglect does 
not amount to a dismissal for plaintiff's excusable 
neglect and thus is not within the one year limit 
of Rule 60(b) . . . . Here the defendant was an unedu-
cated laymen. He does not read well and even after 
patient explanation has difficulty comprehending the 
involutions of a legal proceeding. . . . Certainly 
justice requires that in the circumstances of this 
case this default judgment be set aside." Id. at 
1311-1312 
In Steuart v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234 (D. C. Cir. 1964) 
the Circuit Court upheld a lower court's decision allowing 
the reinstatement of a complaint after it had been dismissed 
for over two years with prejudice. The Court in this case 
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stated as to the conduct of plaintiff's attorney: 
"But the District Court did not act on the 
theory on excusable neglect. On the contrary, it 
expressly applied the 'catch-all rule' 60(b)(6). 
Counsel's neglect was not excusable and the Court, 
by clear implication, so found. The judge said 
he felt 'that in this particular case the client, 
plaintiff, a person unfamiliar with court procedures, 
should not be penalized by the action of his counsel, 
who admittedly did not attend to the matter when 
he received notice of the contemplated dismissal." 
Id. at 235. 
State Courts have also granted relief from the inexcusable 
neglect and negligence of an attorney. In Treadaway v. Meador, 
436 P.2d 902 (Ariz. 1968) the court held that the trial court 
abused its discretion in failing to set aside a judgment of 
dismissal entered for failure of the plaintiffs to answer 
Interrogatories. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff 
had engaged an attorney and had fully attempted to comply with 
the Court's directions to answer the interrogatories but that 
the attorney himself failed to answer them. In addition, the 
attorney was subsequently disbarred for his conduct in this and 
similar cases.: 
In Dudley v. Keller, 521 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1974) the Court 
upheld a lower court's determination that a default judgment 
of $50,000 should be set aside because of the inexcusable 
neglect on the part of the defendant's former counsel. Counsel 
in this case failed to answer a Complaint and failed to attend 
a hearing at which time default judgment was entered. The 
Court stated: 
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"Gross negligence on the part of counsel 
resulting in a default judgment is considered 
excusable neglect on the part of the client 
entitling him to have the judgment set aside." 
Finally, in Coeber v. Rath, 435 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1967) the 
Supreme Court of Colorado reversed a lower court's refusal 
to set aside a default judgment granted upon the failure to 
answer interrogatories. This case is very similar to the case 
above. The representations made to the client in that case 
were similar to those made here. The Court quoted the testi-
mony of the client in the Coeber case: 
"And Mr. Morgan went on to say, 'Don't 
worry about this.1 He said, 'I will go to court 
to protect your interests. . . . And at the 
time I had no idea what interrogatories and 
pleadings were. . . and he said that if he needed 
anything he would get in touch with us. . . . I 
contacted Mr. Morgan after that. I don't remember 
how soon after that, just to ask him if he had 
gotten these papers (the interrogatories) and he 
said that he had. That was the extent of my 
conversation with Mr. Morgan. And I, of course, 
assumed he was taking care of it." IdL 230. 
And commenting upon the facts of this case as related to the 
Rule 60(b) motion the court stated: 
"In the instant case the defendants had alleged 
a meritorious defense; the case was at issue before 
the entry of the default judgment. From the foregoing 
factual recitation, it is clear that defendant's 
counsel was negligent. That neglect was the primary 
cause for the defendants' failure to answer the 
interrogatories. Counsel neglect was inexcusable 
but, under the circumstances here, this neglect should 
not be imputed to the defendants." 
The Trial Court, in the Coeber case while denying the relief 
to the clients submitted a letter to the Bar Association 
^1 A 
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requesting that an investigation be conducted of the attorney's 
conduct. The Supreme Court in commenting upon this letter 
said: 
"It is obvious from this letter that although 
the Court recognized the gross neglect of counsel, 
yet, by its very action, it punished the defendants, 
whose only dereliction was the misplacing of 
confidence in their attorney. There is nothing 
to indicate that setting aside the default and 
ordering a trial on the merits would unwarrantedly 
prejudice the plaintiffs. . ." idL 232 
Thus, the rules clearly provide for the setting aside of 
default judgments when such judgments were obtained by the 
gross neglect and negligence of the defendant's counsel. 
Examining the record in this case reveals the following: 
1. That sanctions were brought against appellants 
for failure to attend two depositions in January of 1974 when 
Mr. Fullmer failed to inform defendant, residing principally 
in Idaho, of the dates of said depositions. As in the 
Coeber case, Van Tassell automatically sent all papers and 
documents to his attorney, Boyd Fullmer, with the presumption 
that Fullmer would advise him what to do. This presumption 
was obviously incorrect. 
2. As early as July 15, 1974, an Order was entered 
by Judge Swan requiring the production of certain documents 
and a fee of $100.00 to be paid to plaintiff's attorney. The 
rest of these documents were retained by Boyd Fullmer and 
out of the control of Van Tassell. Van Tassell was never advised of 
this Order nor of the $100.00 fine. 
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3. On June 24, 1974, a set of interrogatories were 
served upon Mr. Fullmer. These interrogatories were never 
answered. On September 30 an Order was entered to answer the 
interrogatories or sanctions would be imposed. A similar 
Order was made on December 18, 1974, and March 5, 1975, and 
a motion was made by Mr. Findley on March 12 to enter default 
if discovery was not completed. During this time, Mr. 
Fullmer used the excuse of defendant's presence in Idaho and 
his unavailability during a world tour even though defendant 
was always reachable by telephone and within four hours of 
Salt Lake and even though Fullmer had three months' notice 
of the world tour trip. 
4. On October 17, 1974, plaintiff served Request 
for Admissions and Request for Production of Documents upon 
Mr. Fullmer. None of these admissions or documents were 
ever answered or produced. Van Tassell was not informed of 
these admissions or requests until March of 1975 and then 
was told not to worry about them. He was not told about the 
December 18 Order requiring that the Admissions be answered, 
nor the March 4 Order that all Admissions would be deemed 
admitted unless answered by March 14. 
5. Within approximately 30 days before the trial 
date, Fullmer informed Van Tassell that Fullmer did not have 
time to represent him in the trial. Vantassal agreed to 
obtain Reed Tuft and the file was turned over to Mr. Tuft. 
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Mr. Tuft was made aware of these discovery requests but told 
Mr. Van Tassell not to worry since a continuance would be 
granted. 
6. During the month of March, Van Tassell was told 
by both Fullmer and Tuft that the March 19 hearing was a 
pretrial and to tell anyone who asked that that was his 
understanding. It was obviously Tuft's intention to protect 
himself by alleging confusion in the event that his strategy 
for delaying the trial did not work out. 
7. That on the eve of trial Van Tassell asked both 
Fullmer and Tuft whether he should appear at the "pretrial" 
hearing. He was told by both of them not to worry and not to 
appear. Tuft then sent in a Notice of Appearance two days 
before the trial so that it would not arrive until the day 
of trial. Tuft's strategy as explained by an associate in 
his firm (Sykes' affidavit) was to get a long continuance 
rather than a two week continuance which was commonly granted 
in such cases. 
8. On the date of trial, Mr. Fullmer correctly 
advised the Court that Van Tassell had been made aware of the 
Admissions and Interrogatories and correctly advised the 
Court that Fullmer had told Van Tassell that Fullmer would 
withdraw from the case. Mr. Fullmer incorrectly stated, 
however, that Van Tassell was made aware of the serious 
consequences of failing to answer these documents or that 
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he was aware that Tuft would not be appearing to represent him. 
No effort was made by the Trial Court to contact Van Tassell 
personally or to contact Mr. Tuft. Thus, the half truths 
of Mr. Fullmer seemingly convinced the Trial Court that 
Van Tassell had failed to cooperate and was willing to be 
liable for a $300,000 judgment against him and waive a valid 
claim of $200,000 against Mr. Flick. 
9. It was several days after the judgment had been 
entered before Van Tassell learned of the judgment by calling 
Mr. Fullmer, not Mr. Tuft. Even in spite of the judgment, 
Tuft was evidently confident that the Trial Court would 
overturn the default judgment using his "confusion" theory. 
10. Tuft prepared an affidavit for Van Tassell with 
several inaccuracies but convinced him that they were 
"technicalities" or points which did not matter and Van Tassell 
signed the Motion not understanding that he was in effect 
testifying. The Motion itself is improper since it includes 
legal argument and facts not known to Van Tassell personally. 
Evidently, Tuft was hesitant in signing a Motion himself for 
fear of the consequences. 
11. On March 22, Tuft obtained an Order from the 
Court allowing him to represent Van Tassell. Tuft and Marshall 
argued to the Trial Court that they had some confusion in 
thinking that a formal order of entry had to be made separately 
from a withdrawal of counsel. This again, according to the 
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Affidavit of Robert Sykes who was associated with Tuft at 
that time, was a method of protecting Tuft from appearing 
at the trial. 
12. On April 24, 1975, the date of the hearing to 
set aside the judgment, Tuft delegated this important task 
involving Van Tassell's $300,000 to John Marshall, his partner, 
who had had little connection with the case. Marshall, in 
turn, relied upon the briefing by Robert Sykes of the pertinent 
facts and law of the case even though Sykes had not even 
entered the firm until after the default judgment was obtained. 
Marshall was forced to proffer testimony of Tuft as to the 
explanation of his conduct in not appearing. (Page 27 Transcript 
of April 24, 1975). Mr. Van Tassell testified at this hearing that 
Fullmer had specifically told him not to come for the trial 
(page 13) and that he had been told that "this trial coming 
up was a pretrial" (page 11). He also stated he did not know 
the difference between a trial and a pretrial (page 13). 
Marshall admitted that Van Tassell would testify that he had not 
received a copy of the discovery papers until March 10 which 
is in accord with Van Tassellfs testimony, (page 31) The 
crux of Marshall's argument for "excusable neglect is succinctly 
stated in this passage: / 
"Well, that's all, is that Mr. Tuft would 
testify that he told everybody that he was not 
going to appear as long as the case was really 
in Mr. Fullmer's hands, until he was relieved 
he was not going to appear. The reason we did 
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not make motions together is he did not understand 
there was a trial date. He stated that his under-
standing was the same as Mr, Van Tassellfs, but it 
was a pretrial that was coming up. Now I think 
that the evidence shows that there is purely 
excusable neglect." (Pages 27-28) 
If this were the case that Fullmer failed to inform Mr. Tuft 
of the trial date after filing a formal notice of withdrawal, 
then Mr. Fullmer must be deemed grossly negligent. It is 
more likely, however, as stated in the Sykes affidavit, that 
it was Tuft's strategy not to appear at the trial so that a 
long continuance would be granted. 
13. As a final blow to Van Tassell, Tuft would not 
represent him in the appeal unless he agreed to give to Tuft 
a mortgage for $25,000. Van Tassell fled back to Fullmer for 
representation knowing no other attorneys. Fullmer in his 
normal manner improperly appealed to the Supreme Court from 
an Order which did not exist and which, if it had, would have 
been non-appealable. Neither Tuft nor Fullmer appealed from 
the April 2, 1975, judgment which would have allowed Van Tassell 
to raise questions on the merit concerning the admissions made 
by Flick as to certain amounts owing to Van Tassell. 
The preceeding examples illustrate the gross negligence 
conducted by Mr. Fullmer and Mr. Tuft in the representation 
of Van Tassell. If this were not bad enough, Van Tassell 
was represented by the partner of one of the negligent 
lawyers in the only evidentiary hearing held to examine 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the reasons for the default. An examination of this trans-
cript clearly shows that the conduct of Tuft was never 
touched upon and that the conduct of Fullmer preceeding 
the default and the discovery problems was not examined in 
any detail whatsoever. Appellant's new counsel would submit 
that both Fullmer and Marshall attempted to conceal the 
gross injustice which had been perpetrated on Van Tassell. 
For this reason, as stated previously, the trial court was 
correct in finding no excusable neglect and had no other 
course of action open to it from the evidence presented at 
this hearing. 
Therefore, Appellants submit that the supplemented records 
before this Court is sufficient for a finding that the default 
judgment should be set aside. As stated in defendant's 
affidavit, there have been only minor judgments and other 
law suits brought against defendant since the time of this 
judgment and unless plaintiffs can show to the contrary, there 
will be no harm to the plaintiffs by proceeding to trial on 
the merits. In the alternative, appellants would request 
that a full evidentiary hearing be held in the District Court 
with the opportunity of appellants to cross-examine the 
various parties to this matter so that the trial court may 
have a full disclosure of the events leading to the default 
and the subsequent events thereafter. The only other alterna-
tive, that of a malpractice action against the attorneys, 
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is totally inadequate in light of the amount of award and 
irreparable harm which would occur to Van Tassell during the 
pendency of such a suit. 
CONCLUSION 
All of the reasons as outlined in respondent's brief 
supporting the default and outlined in his argument at the 
hearing (p. 29-31) as seen from an examination of the affidavits 
filed in this case by the defendant and his family and also by 
an attorney practicing with Mr. Tuft at the.time, shows that 
these occurrences were solely caused by the negligence and 
gross neglect of either Mr. Fullmer or Mr. Tuft or both. 
Failure to attend trial, the failure to move for a continuance, 
and the failure to respond to discovery were all caused by the 
attorneys; not by the client. While litigation must have 
finality, a judgment, especially of this size and magnitude, 
must be based upon a full disclosure of the reasons giving rise 
to the judgment. Through the conduct of these attorneys in the 
trial court a full opportunity to review the record was 
never given. It is ludicrous to think that a man such as 
Mr. Van Tassell would jeopardize his assets by ignoring 
repeated orders of the Court and by failing to attend a 
trial in which he had a substantial interest both in losing 
and in gaining. The more logical assumption must be, therefore, 
that for whatever reasons, Mr. Van Tassell was misled and 
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and misinformed by his attorneys who he relied upon to 
represent him in this litigation. Since the only damage 
done to plaintiffs would be the cost of this litigation up 
to this point, a cost which appellants would gladly pay, and 
since there is no showing on any prejudice resulting from the 
setting aside of this judgment, justice requires a reversal 
as a matter of law of the Court's order or, at the least, 
an opportunity for a full hearing as to the conduct of the 
parties. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
Craig S. Cook 
Michael R. Carlston 
._'.. 701 Continental Bank Building 
v ;
 Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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APPENDIX 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT SYKES 
AFFIDAVIT OF GLEN VAN TASSELL 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERMA VAN TASSELL 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOY VAN TASSELL 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE W. FLICK, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, AFFIDAVIT OF 
ROBERT SYKES 
vs. 
GLEN VAN TASSELL and VAN'S 
SERVICE, INC., a corporation, Case No. 14154 
Defendants-Appellants. 
STATE OF UTAH } 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Robert Sykes, after being first duly sworn, deposes 
and says: 
1. I am a practicing and licensed lawyer in the 
State of Utah. 
2. From late March through early June, 1975 I was 
associated with Tuft and Marshall, attorneys at law, on 
a percentage basis. 
3. On approximately March 21st, I was told by 
Mr. Tuft to read the file in the FJLick vs. Van Tassell 
case and to give my opinion as to what should be done. 
4. During my first week of work, I learned that a 
default judgment had been entered against Glen Van Tassell 
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in excess of $250,000.00, I further learned that 
Mr* Tuft did not appear on behalf of defendant at this 
hearing* 
5, In conversations I had with Mr. Tuft during 
late March 19 75f Mr. Tuft explained why he did not 
appear at the trial. He informed me that he did not 
appear because he felt the trial court would have only 
given him a 2-week continuance before the trial and that 
he did not feel that that was sufficient time for prepar-
ation. He stated that for this reason he had carefully 
drafted a petition for his appearance and timed it to 
arrive very shortly before the trial date in order to 
make it impossible for the judge to order him to try the 
case on March 19th. As part of his strategy, Mr. Tuft said that he 
couched the language of the petition to make it condi-
tional upon Mr. Fullmerfs withdrawal. Mr. Tuft informed 
me that it was also his strategy to make Mr. Van Tassell 
appear to be without legal counsel on the trial date so 
that Mr. Tuft would not be forced to try the case on the 
19th and so that Van Tassell would be granted a substan-
tial continuance (i.e. longer than two weeks). 
6. Mr. Tuft informed me that he was surprised when the 
-2-
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default was actually entered rather than a continuance 
being granted. 
7. On or about April lr 1975, I first met 
Mr. Van Tassell personally. On this and several 
subsequent occasions he informed me and Mr. Tuft that he 
had not been told by anyone that he need come to court 
on the trial date. 
8. During the two weeks prior to April 23rd, I 
asked Mr. Tuft what should be done to prepare for the 
April 24th Motion to set aside the default. I was told 
by Mr. Tuft not to do any more on the case until we were 
paid the balance of $2,000,00 allegedly due from 
Van Tassell. On the evening of April 23rd at approxi-
mately 5:00 p.m. I telephoned Mr. Tuft and Mr. Marshall 
at Murdock Engineering in Clearfield. I asked Mr. Tuft 
if he would be arguing the Motion on the 24th and if I 
should do anything in preparation for it. He said I 
should speak with John Marshall about it. John Marshall, 
his law partner, told me that he would probably argue 
the Motion himself and that I should do a memorandum in 
support of the Motion. I expressed my reservations 
about having John do the argument since he was not as 
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familiar with the facts of the case as were Mr. Tuft and 
myself. I had previously expressed my concern to 
Mr. Tuft that he appear and argue the Motion himself. 
9. During that night and into the early hours of 
April 24th, I researched the law concerning the setting 
aside of default judgments and prepared a memorandum of 
points and authorities. The memorandum was typed early 
on the morning of the 24th. I drove with Mr. Marshall 
from Salt Lake to Bountiful and gave him a brief reci-
tation of the facts and the law of the case. When we 
arrived in Farmington, Mr. Tuft and Mr. Van Tassell were 
present. When I saw Mr. Tuft I thought he was now going 
to argue the Motion but he soon stated that he would 
probably leave and that it would be better anyway if 
John Marshall argued the Motion for him. He stated that 
he had to return shortly to Murdock Engineering in 
Clearfield but said that he was only 20 minutes away if 
we needed him. 
10; I witnessed the argument of Mr. Marshall and 
the entire proceeding that day and believe that 
Mr. Marshall did an excelleht. job under the circum-
stances. However, because he did not have the time to 
-4-
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familiarize himself with the complex facts of the case, 
I do not believe he was able to adequately show the 
conduct of Van Tassell and his attorneys as to the 
discovery delays and the failure to attend the trial. 
11. It is my opinion that crucial lines of testi-
mony were not explored or adequately presented to the 
Court by Mr. Marshall (through no real fault of his own) 
or by Mr. Findley and that the trial court was not fully 
advised as to what actually happened concerning the 
events leading to the default judgment. 
12. It is my belief that defendant has a valid 
defense and counterclaim against plaintiff. 
13. I have since left the employment of Mr, Tuft 
and am now practicing law with another firm in Salt Lake 
City. 
Robert Sykes / 
& . / 0 , . Subscribed and sworn to before me this <W day 
_,—JZ 
of February, 1976. 
/) 
f\*.n-f< AnJ' .7 
•-NO'TARY PUBLIC " = T ~ 
Res id ing a t ~~j*pj OCj$ (v(-f^ 
o 
My Commission Expires: 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE W. FLICK, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , AFFIDAVIT OF 
GLEN VAN TASSELL 
v s . 
GLEN VAN TASSELL a n d VAN'S 
SERVICE, INC., a corporation, Case No. 14154 
Defendants-Appellants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Glen Van Tassell, after being first duly sworn, 
deposes and says: 
1. That I am the individual defendant in the 
above-entitled case and am the major shareholder and 
President of Van's Service, Inc. 
2. In December of 1973 I was served with a 
Complaint in the above-entitled action and immediately 
contacted Attorney Boyd Fullmer to represent me in this 
matter. 
3. During a large part of 1974 I commuted between 
Bountiful, Utah and Bancroft,• Idaho and spent approxi-
mately six out of seven days in Idaho. I was reachable 
by telephone and within three hours of each location. 
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I worked with only my son during this period, 
4. While in Idahof I did not personally receive 
any notices that my deposition was to be taken prior to 
February 4, 19 74 but I believe my wife was served with 
some kind of papers in January 1974 and, since I was in 
Idaho, I instructed her to deliver the papers to my 
attorney, Boyd Fullmer, I was never informed by 
Mr. Fullmer of any date for my deposition other than 
February 4f 1974 and never requested him to reschedule 
my deposition because of my cattle business, 
5. At the time of my deposition Mr. Fullmer had 
the only copies of the Idaho mining claims contract and 
he agreed to give plaintiff's attorney a copy at the 
time of my deposition, 
6. During the entire course of proceedings up 
until the early part of Marchf 19 75 I was never shown or 
informed by Mr. Fullmer that I was to answer the 
Interrogatories submitted by plaintiff's counsel on 
June 24, 1974 nor was I requested to supply information. 
1. I was never informed by Mr. Fullmer that I was 
to produce documents listed' in a July 15, 1974 Order of 
Judge Thornley Swan nor was I informed that I was to pay 
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$100,00 attorney's fee for Mr. Fullmerfs failure to 
attend the trial. 
8. While it is true that I went on a world tour in 
July and August of 1974rMr. Fullmer knew that I would 
leave for this trip three months before,and I consulted 
Mr. Fullmer and asked him if there were anything I should 
do before leaving, and he informed me that there was 
nothing to do at that time. 
9. I was never informed by Mr. Fullmer in 
September of 19 74 that an Order was entered by Judge 
Gould commanding me to answer the June 24 Interrogatories 
by October 20, 19 74. 
10. I was never informed by Mr. Fullmer of the 
Request for Admissions filed by plaintiff's attorney on 
October 17, 19 74 or the Request for Production of 
certain documents filed upon the same day until the 
early part of Marchf 19 75 and was told then they need 
not be answered or produced. 
11. I never authorized Mr. Fullmer to object to 
answering the admissions or producing the documents. 
While it is true that I was' in Idaho I had available two 
telephone numbers at which Mr. Fullmer could reach mer 
-3-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
had continual mail service, and was only four hours away 
from my Utah residence and would have been willing to 
come to Utah upon Mr. Fullmerfs request had I been so 
informed, 
12, I was never informed by Mr, Fullmer that 
plaintiff's attorney was again moving for sanctions for 
failure to comply with discovery and that he was seeking 
attorney1s fees of $800,00 as outlined in his Motion of 
November 15, 1974. 
13, I asked Mr, Fullmer if we could make a claim 
against plaintiff for the amount owing to me of approxi-
mately $200,000.00 on the mining claims which I sold 
plaintiff, for half of the amount necessary to perform 
the annual assessment work, and for the defamation of 
defendant's character by plaintiff. Mr. Fullmer 
informed me that he filed a Counterclaim concerning all 
of these claims. 
14, I was not informed by Mr. Fullmer of the 
December 18, 1974 Order entered by Judge Swan ordering 
that sanctions be imposed for failure to answer the 
Interrogatories, Admissions, and Production of Documents 
which I was still unaware even existed. 
-4-
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15. I never received nor was informed of the 
existence of a document known as "Notice of Motion" 
dated February 19, 1975 informing Mr. Fullmer that a 
Motion to strike my Answer would be entered for failure 
to respond to discovery. 
16. I personally never received a "Notice to 
Appoint Counsel" dated February 28, 1975 which was 
submitted by plaintiff's attorney. I do remember that 
I was in Idaho during that period and talked to my wife 
about a letter which had come from the plaintiff's law 
firm. She asked me what to do with it and I told her to 
take the letter to Mr. Fullmer. I am informed that my 
daughter delivered this letter to Mr. Fullmerfs office. 
17. I was not informed by Mr. Fullmer that an 
Order had been entered by Judge Swan on March 4, 1975 to 
strike my Answer if discovery was not completed by 
March 14th. 
18. Sometime in the middle or end of February 
Mr. Fullmer informed me that he did not think he had 
sufficient time to try my case in the latter part of 
March and wanted to withdraw. 
19. I agreed he should withdraw. He recommended 
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that I retain Mr. Reed Tuft as my new attorney. A 
meeting was held with Mr. Tuft in the latter part of 
February or the first part of March at which time Mr. 
Tuft informed me that he would handle my case presuming 
that I paid him at least $2f000.00. Mr. Tuft told me not 
to worry about anything and that he was going to get an 
extension from the March 19th date which he said was a 
pretrial and that the court would grant additional time. 
Fullmer concurred in this statement. 
20. On this same day Mr. Fullmer delivered my file 
to Mr. Tuft. Mr. Fullmer showed Mr. Tuft the 
Interrogatories, and Requests. This was the first time 
I was shown these documents. Mr. Tuft informed me that 
there was no point in answering them at that time since 
a continuance would be granted by the trial court. I 
was perfectly willing and able to try to answer those 
questions had Mr. Tuft advised me to do so. 
'.21. I was not informed of Judge Swan's denial of 
Fullmer1s Motion for a Continuance nor that the admissions 
would be deemed true if not answered by March 14th. 
22. I was never informed by Mr. Fullmer of the 
notice sent to him on March 12# 1975 by Mr. Findlay, 
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counsel for plaintiff# noticing that plaintifffs counsel 
would move for a default for a failure to respond to the 
discovery request. 
23. Between March 3rd and March 19th I repeatedly 
called both Mr. Tuft and Mr. Fullmer. I was told by 
Mr. Fullmer to do whatever Mr. Tuft requested. Mr. Tuft 
informed me that it would be unnecessary for me to 
attend the March 19th trial and told me to tell anyone 
who asked me that it was my understanding that it was a 
pretrial. Mr. Tuft requested that I go to his office 
during this period and I did go to his office on three 
or four occasions. Upon each time, however# he merely 
asked me for more money and informed me that I need not 
worry as long as I pay him the money. I paid him 
$1#700.00. 
24. On approximately March 18th I again called 
Mr. Fullmer and asked him if I needed to attend the 
hearing and he said don't attend it if Tuft tells you 
not to. He stated it was his understanding that I was 
not to come. I called Mr. Tuft and he told me not to 
worry about it and to be sure to say that it was my 
understanding that it was a pretrial if anyone asked. I 
did not know the distinction between a pretrial and tria 
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He said that he would take care of everything and would 
let me know what to do. I presumed Tuft would appear 
personally at the hearing. 
25. On March 19, 1975 I was at my Bountiful 
residence and would have been available for trial within 
one hour after being notified had my counsel telephoned 
me. 
26. On March 20, 1975 I called Mr. Tuft and asked 
him what had developed. He informed me it was under 
advisement and to call him in three or four days. No 
mention of any "judgment" was made in the conversation 
and I was unclear what was being considered. 
27. I talked to Fullmer two or three days later 
and was informed by him that a judgment had been entered 
against me on March 19. I was very upset and immedi-
ately called Tuft and he said a judgment had been 
entered but that it would be set aside. He told me not 
to worry and that he would take care of it if I sent him 
more money. 
28. On April 1st I went to the offices of Reed 
Tuft to sign a document he had prepared for me. I asked 
him why he said in the documents I had moved my residence 
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to Idaho when I was still living in Bountiful and he 
explained that residence was a legal term and that I was 
now technically residenced in Idaho. I also told him it 
was rare that I could not be reached by telephone but he 
said that wasn't important and not to worry about it. 
29. I told Mr. Tuft that I did not consider myself 
unable to communicate with Mr. Fullmer or that there was 
any tension between us as stated in the documents. He 
informed me that Mr. Fullmer believed there was such a 
failure and tension and therefore it was proper for me 
to make this statement since Mr. Fullmer would not. I 
was surprised at this representation but was assured 
that it wasn't important either. 
30. I told him I didn't understand or know the 
information contained in the last part of the paper 
concerning Tuft's reasons, not having counsel, and 
prejudice but was told by Tuft that it was just a 
formality and that this was "lawyer talk." 
31. Mr. Tuft toId.me to sign the document in two 
places and that it would be submitted to the court. I 
signed the document as instructed by Mr. Tuft but did 
not understand why it was necessary for me to sign it or 
that it was like testifying in court. 
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32. Around April 23rd I was informed by Mr. Tuft 
to go to the Davis County Courthouse the next day where 
a hearing would be held to set aside the judgment. He 
told me not to worry# that everything would be taken 
care of. 
33. On April 24th I met Mr. Tuft# Mr. Marshall, 
his law partner, and Mr. Sykes, an associate, at the 
courthouse doors. Mr. Marshall stated that he was not 
prepared to handle it. Mr. Tuft told Mr. Marshall that 
it would work better without Mr. Tuft present and that 
Marshall should do the best that he could. As we were 
leaving Mr. Tuft told me to be sure to testify that the 
March 19th proceeding was a pretrial. 
34. At the hearing I testified as best I could 
although I had not gone over the dates with any 
attorneys prior to my entering the room. I told the 
court that I thought it was a pretrial on March 19th as 
Mr. Tuft had instructed me to do and truthfully told the 
court that I did not know the difference between a 
pretrial and a trial. 
35. Around May 15th Mr. Tuft told me he would 
continue to represent me in the case if I would give him 
a $25,000.00 mortgage on my property as security for his 
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attorney's fees, I told him that I would not do that 
and he informed me to seek other counsel, 
36. I then contacted Mr. Fullmer who said he would 
represent ma on the appeal. 
37. To my best information and belief I have paid 
Mr. Fullmer approximately $5,000.00 to handle this liti-
gation from its inception to the appeal. 
38. Since March 19th I have had judgments obtained 
against me for less than $5,000.00 although one such 
judgment was entered by default since Mr. Fullmer failed 
to respond. I presently have pending other lawsuits in 
which the maximum potential recovery is approximately 
$10,000.00. My assets greatly exceed these liabilities. 
39. I have been fully advised by my counsel that 
the signing of this document is the same as testifying 
in court under oath and I have carefully reviewed this 
Affidavit and believe that it accurately reflects what 
really happened during the proceedings of this case. 
AiL /)SL«,£P 
Glen Van Tassell / 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this j.^Xft- day 
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of February, 19 76. 
MAMA. /Mo* 
NOTARY 'PUBLIC 
Residing at 
My Commission Expires: 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE W. FLICK, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , AFFIDAVIT OF 
ERMA VAN TASSELL 
v s . 
GLEN VAN TASSELL a n d VAN'S 
SERVICE, INC., a corporation, Case No. 14154 
Defendants-Appellants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Erma Van Tassell, after being first duly sworn, 
deposes and says: 
1. That I am the wife of Glen Van Tassell, 
defendant in the above-entitled action. 
2. That my husband was frequently in Idaho during 
the proceedings of this lawsuit. 
3. In the early part of 1974 I was served with 
papers. I talked to my husband who was in Idaho who 
told me to deliver them to Boyd Fullmer since he would 
know what to do with them. I either gave them to my 
daughter or son for delivery or mailed them to Mr. Fullmer. 
4. That on several occasions documents arrived in 
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letters with law firm letterheads to our residence in 
Bountiful. I generally did not open these letters. 
5. To the best of my memory I received one such 
letter from the law firm of Nielsen, Conder, Henriod & 
Gottfredson, who I knew to be the firm representing 
Mr. Flick. 
6. That upon receipt of this letter I contacted my 
husband in Idaho and he informed me that I should send 
it to Mr. Fullmer immediately. 
7. I gave this letter to my daughter Joy and told 
her to take it to Mr. Fullmer. 
8. Upon return she informed me that she had 
delivered it to his office. 
\&A^y^ L'O™ J*<*^°-~^ 
Erma Van Tassell 
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this / l/M day 
of February, 1976. 
. loMJJb i^y 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at 
My Commission Expires: 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE W. FLICK, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
GLEN VAN TASSELL and VAN\S 
SERVICE, INC., a corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
JOY VAN TASSELL 
Case No. 14154 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT ) 
Joy Van Tassell, after being first duly sworn, 
deposes and says: 
1. That I am the daughter of the defendant Glen 
Van Tassell. 
2. That on several occasions I delivered documents 
to Mr. Boyd Fullmer1s office. 
3. That I cannot specifically remember what 
documents I delivered but believe that I made one such 
trip sometime in the latter part of February or early 
March. 
Uk 
*> Joy Van Tassell 
Jt-rtA j'ffrp**-
 v  s< 
Subscr ibed and sworn to be fo re me t h i s day 
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of February/ 19 76. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at 
My Commission Expires: 
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